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 Introduction 
 Melville’s Inhumanities 
 By the sentence of the angels, by the decree of the saints, we anathema-
tize, cut off , curse and execrate Baruch Spinoza, in the presence of these 
sacred books with the six hundred and thirteen precepts which are written 
therein, with the anathema wherewith Joshua anathematized Jericho; with 
the cursing wherewith Elisha cursed the children; and with all the cursings 
which are written in the Book of the Law: cursed be he by day, and cursed 
by night; cursed when he lieth down, and cursed when he riseth up; cursed 
when he goeth out, and cursed when he cometh in; the Lord pardon him 
never; the wrath and fury of the Lord burn upon this man, and bring upon 
him all the curses which are written in the Book of Law. Th e Lord blot out 
his name under heaven. Th e Lord set him apart for destruction from all the 
tribes of Israel, with all the curses of the fi rmament which are written in the 
Book of this Law … Th ere shall no man speak to him, no man write to him, 
no man show him any kindness, no man stay under the same roof with him, 
no man come nigh him. 1  
 At the outset of his essay “Spinoza” from the fi rst edition of his  Essays in 
Criticism (1865), Matthew Arnold thus cites the vehement condemnation and 
excommunication of Spinoza by the rabbis of Amsterdam. Commenting on 
the passage, Arnold writes: “With these amenities, the current compliments 
of theological parting, the Jews of the Portuguese synagogue at Amsterdam 
took in 1656 (and not in 1660 as has till now been commonly supposed) their 
leave of their erring brother, Baruch or Benedict Spinoza. Th ey remained 
children of Israel, and he became a child of modern Europe.” 2  
 In his own edition of Arnold’s  Essays , Herman Melville marks this whole 
citation, putting a curly bracket and an “X” in the margin next to the fi nal 
set of curses or, as Arnold then calls them, “amenities.” (See  Figure 1 .) 
In his related note in the lower margin, Melville surmises: “Th ese ‘ameni-
ties’, are still, (tho now unspoken) in vogue, and even among the athe-
ists.” As such, Melville subtly acknowledges that Spinoza – a dangerous 
heretic in his own time, a fi gure of the radical enlightenment whose 
name became synonymous with atheism, and with whom any association 
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 Figure 1  Herman Melville, markings and annotation on Matthew Arnold’s essay 
“Spinoza” from  Essays in Criticism (1865), *AC85.M4977.Zz865a. 
 Houghton Library, Harvard University. 
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sparked intellectual controversy – implicitly remained a subversive fi gure 
in nineteenth- century thought. Melville is aware that associating with 
Spinoza is a risky philosophical position, one that might invite condemna-
tion: after all, it is still “in vogue” to hold open a special place of derogation 
for Spinoza, “even among the atheists.” 
 Melville had been reading Arnold’s essays in the early 1870s as he was 
preparing his verse- epic  Clarel: A Poem and Pilgrimage in the Holy Land 
(1876). But Melville found in Arnold not only a new stylistic model for 
his developing role as a poet, but also confi rmation, as he had earlier 
in Goethe’s works, of the continued force of Spinoza’s thought. Melville 
would agree with Arnold that, despite the “disparagement and detraction” 
of Voltaire and Bayle, or the “disfavor cast upon him by the repeated 
charge of atheism,” Spinoza’s importance is still steadily rising; that his 
“name and work … bid fair to become what they deserve to become, – in 
the history of modern philosophy the central point of interest.” 3  Arnold’s 
citation of the Amsterdam rabbis’ fi erce denunciation of Spinoza is thus 
not the only instance of Melville’s marginalia that evinces his incipient 
interest in  – or knowledge of  – Spinoza’s thought. A  little further on, 
Melville notes that, in the time since Arnold published his essay in 1865, 
a new English translation of Spinoza’s  Ethics appeared in 1871. 4  He under-
lines key Spinozan concepts discussed by Arnold, such as the  conatus , the 
 amor intellectualis Dei , and the joyful and sad passions (Melville marks 
the lines “Joy is man’s passage to a greater perfection … Sorrow is man’s 
passage to a lesser perfection”). 5  Melville pays special attention to Arnold’s 
argument concerning what had attracted Goethe to Spinoza: “ I mean his 
denial of fi nal causes , and his stoicism, a stoicism not passive, but active. 
For a mind like Goethe’s  – a mind profoundly impartial and passionately 
aspiring after the science,  not of men only, but of universal nature  – the 
popular philosophy, which explains all things by reference to man, and 
even of certain classes of men, was utterly repulsive” [Melville’s underlin-
ing]. 6  To bolster his point, Arnold quotes two passages from Spinoza’s 
 Tractatus Th eologico- Politicus , passages that Melville again marks. Firstly, 
“God directs nature, according as the universal laws of nature, but not 
according as the particular laws of human nature require; and so God 
has regard, not of the human race only, but of entire nature.” 7  Second, 
regarding Spinoza’s Stoicism, which for Arnold is “as a pendant” to his 
denial of fi nal causes (in a passage indeed  triple marked in the margin of 
Melville’s own edition): “ Non studemus, ut natura nobis, sed contra ut nos 
naturae pareamus (Our desire is not that nature may obey us, but, on the 
contrary, that we may obey nature) . ” 8  Melville recognized key elements 
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of Spinoza’s philosophy in other works of Arnold, as well, as in the poem 
“Heine’s Grave” from his 1867  New Poems: 
 Th at was Heine!  and we 
 Myriads who live, who have lived, 
 What are we all, but a mood, 
 A single mood, of the life 
 Of the Being in whom we exist, 
 Who alone is all things in one. (See  Figure 2 .) 9  
 Next to a large bracket adjacent to these lines from the poem, Melville 
pencils “Spinoza” thus registering how Arnold, via Heine, reproduces 
Spinoza’s monistic ontology. Th e infi nitude of modes expresses a univocal 
substance: “the Being in whom we exist/ Who is all things in one.” 
 Marginal markings do not necessarily indicate a reader’s philosophical 
propensities. Nevertheless, they can bring into initial focus the key invest-
ments of  Herman Melville and the Politics of the Inhuman , investments 
shaped by Spinoza’s infl uence on Melville. First, in general terms, we get 
a glimpse of how Melville approached philosophy as an invested thinker- 
writer and a creative reader. Like Emerson, Melville was an extensive 
and eclectic reader of philosophy, even if his reading was often mediated 
through second- hand sources: Melville reading Arnold reading Spinoza. 
What is more, it was not in Arnold that Melville had fi rst encountered 
Spinoza. It is not clear whether Melville had read Spinoza directly, even 
in the Willis translation of the  Ethics he cites in his marginal note. But 
Melville had found him, if indirectly, in a variety of sources such as Pierre 
Bayle’s  Historical and Philosophical Dictionary (whose chapter on Spinoza 
is infamously misleading), reference works like the  Penny Cyclopedia for the 
Diff usion of Useful Knowledge , 10  as well as, perhaps most compellingly for 
Melville, in Goethe’s autobiography,  Poetry and Truth. In another indica-
tive instance of marginalia, Melville makes a checkmark next to Goethe’s 
comment that Spinoza’s “name even at this day, seems to mark the limit of 
all speculative eff orts.” 11  
 Second, and more specifi cally, Spinoza comes to signify for Melville 
a profoundly nonanthropocentric philosophy, one founded on the reso-
lute inhumanness and impersonality of “God, or Nature.” It is a thought, 
as Melville underlined, “ not of men only, but of universal nature, ” and 
that does not “explain all things by reference to man, and even of certain 
classes of men.” Rather, as Spinoza writes, we do not seek that “nature 
may obey us, but, on the contrary, that we may obey nature.” Th is is fur-
thered through Spinoza’s denial of fi nal causes, a denial of the Aristotelian 
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 Figure 2  Herman Melville, markings and annotation on Matthew Arnold’s poem 
“Heine’s Grave,” from  New Poems (1867), *AC85. M4977. Zz867a. 
 Houghton Library, Harvard University. 
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teleological system of nature in which causes (including human agency) 
are end- directed. For Spinoza, causes are immanent to their eff ects, such 
that the infi nitude of bodies that comprise modal life are given only to 
constant movement and new compositions of forces and aggregate bodies. 
Spinoza therefore understands the human body as a changing collectiv-
ity of materials and forces: “Th e human body is composed of very many 
individuals of a diverse nature, each of which is highly composite.” 12  Th e 
human body, that is, is a composite of diff erent inhuman organic or inor-
ganic bodies – of minerals, microorganisms, elements, aff ects, energies and 
forces that have their own imperatives to persevere apart from what we 
perceive to be our own. Th e human body is an assemblage of various indi-
viduals with their own conatus. Th e human is thus always already multi-
ple, in process, relational, and, indeed,  inhuman . 
 Th ird, Melville, in ways strikingly akin to Spinoza’s relational ontology, 
develops his characters as emerging composite bodies or collectivities. In 
so doing, Melville decouples them from an individual human personhood, 
such that they serve instead as ciphers for compounds of “transindividual” 
relations with inhuman and impersonal forces. In some cases, responding 
to a strain of Romantic pantheism that takes up Spinoza as its philosophi-
cal precedent, Melville casts the dissolutions of individuality his characters 
undergo directly in terms of a “one” permeated by the “all.” Th is is appar-
ent as early as  Mardi , in which Melville’s narrator speaks of the “subtle 
workings of Spinoza’s [soul]” 13  and has Taji recall “the Jew that rejected 
the Talmud, and his all- permeating principle, to which Goethe and others 
have subscribed” ( M , 176). 14  It is memorably rearticulated in an 1851 letter 
to Hawthorne in which Melville discusses his fl irtation with Goethe’s “all 
feeling.” In  Moby- Dick , Ishmael whimsically evinces from the severed head 
of a Sperm whale that it must have been a reader of Plato who’d taken to 
Spinoza in his latter years due to its “speculative indiff erence as to death”; 
he describes how “sunken- eyed” idealists staring from the masthead at the 
Pacifi c can become lost in ontological reveries. 15  
 Yet, as I  will argue in  Chapter  1 , Spinoza’s relational ontology also 
informs  Moby- Dick’s manifold inquiries of composite bodies and imma-
nent forms of materiality in terms of more nuanced interweavings of 
matter and aff ect. Neither human characters nor whales are presented as 
discrete individuals who move through a setting, but are given to persis-
tent processes of instantiating transindividual relations. In turn, Melville’s 
engagement with Spinoza’s “all- permeating principle” becomes further 
complicated in  Pierre , as I will examine in  Chapter 2 . Th is might seem 
strange insofar as Spinoza and Goethe are caricatured in passages often 
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taken to be indicative of Melville’s own philosophical position in relation 
to them, as well as to Platonism and neo- Platonism, German Idealism and 
Romanticism, and American Transcendentalism  – if not to philosophi-
cal speculation more generally.  Pierre’s narrator labels Spinoza as among a 
philosophical procession of “self- imposters” and casts Pierre’s childhood 
friend and latter- day Spinozist, Charles Millthorpe, as one of the “seedy- 
coated Apostles” in New  York City ambitiously “pursuing some crude, 
transcendental Philosophy.” 16  Or, as Millthorpe himself boasts: “Why, lad, 
I  have received propositions from the Editors of the Spinozaist to con-
tribute a weekly column to their paper, and you know how very few can 
understand the Spinozaist; nothing is admitted there but the Ultimate 
Transcendentals” ( P , 280). But given the disparate set of philosophical 
voices ventriloquized in the novel, it would be too hasty to ascribe any 
one of them as Melville’s own position. We might rather think of  Pierre 
as a multifarious literary experiment with the varieties of Spinozist expe-
rience, from a series of “inhuman transformations” 17  that blur categorical 
distinctions between humans and stones, to the drama of sad passions 
in which Pierre’s affi  nities to the Spinozistic/ pantheistic “all feeling” are 
tested through a series of destructive encounters. Melville’s exploration of 
Spinozism continues in his later work, from his development in  Clarel of a 
strikingly nonanthropocentric poetic philosophy in which Spinoza is recast 
as “Pan’s Atheist,” 18  to late poems such as “Venice” or “Th e Parthenon” in 
which Spinoza reemerges as a cipher for the monistic expression of sub-
stance or for a vital materialist force of nonhuman agency as a “Pantheist 
energy of will.” 19  It perhaps culminates in the dissolutions of individual-
ity and impulsive compositions of forces Melville renders in  Billy Budd. 
Indeed much of Melville’s late work seems scrawled across Spinoza’s “starry 
brow” (2.22.110). 
 Lastly, the “subversive genealogy” of Spinoza’s nonanthropocentric, rela-
tional philosophy, as it becomes legible to Melville via Goethe, Arnold and 
others, infl ects Melville’s representations of materiality and, in turn, ani-
mates his incipient inhuman politics.  Herman Melville and the Politics of 
the Inhuman thus off ers a reading of Melville as positioned at the intersec-
tion of the material and the political. Central to this is how Melville reveals 
the two to be engaged ontologically, and not merely analogically. To pose 
questions about human political relations, Melville turns to their inhuman 
qualities and physical and material relations. Melville’s materialist political 
ontology might be thought of in terms of the concept of “transindividual-
ity” which  É tienne Balibar, adapting the term from Gilbert Simondon, 
develops in his reading of Spinoza. Balibar asserts that Spinoza “discovered 
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that it is impossible strictly speaking to have a strong notion of singularity 
without at the same time having a notion of the interaction and interde-
pendence of individuals.” 20  Yet the transindividual does not just repeat 
traditional part/ whole or individual/ collective antinomies. Instead, it pro-
poses a complex ontology of relations that interweaves incomplete and 
ongoing processes of individuation, multiple causalities, and plural tem-
poralities. 21  Th e transindividual relations Melville charts do not respect the 
boundaries of discrete individualities or bodies, but rather become man-
ifest through material fl ows, in tenuous corporeities, and across dynamic 
terraqueous milieus. Melville’s politics of the inhuman becomes realized 
through these transindividual relations. It is a politics of encounters and 
exchanges, of immersions and entanglements. It is a politics of the materi-
ality of embodiment, and of indeterminate processes of disintegration. It is 
a politics of mutual becomings and collective strivings to persevere. 
 Given the heterogeneous yet, mutual striving of Melville’s human 
and nonhuman fi gures, it is not surprising that many recent theorists, 
especially those in who locate themselves in the Spinozan– Deleuzian 
conceptual lineage, have unfolded through Melville’s work a politics of 
the “common.” Following Deleuze’s infl uential essay “Bartleby; or the 
Formula,” Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and 
Cesare Casarino (among others) have invoked Melville’s characters as 
modeling the common 22  as the inventive, nonhomogenizing activity 
of producing not a community of individuals who group themselves 
along the lines of a unifi ed identity, but a “composition of singulari-
ties in a common relationship.” 23  Th e common becomes distanced from 
any nostalgic  Gemeinschaft whose constitution is based on a continual 
reinscription of timeless mythoi into its own self- identity. Like Balibar’s 
transindividuality, the common is based not on individuals who share 
identities (of which the nation- state is the prime example) but on tran-
sindividual singularities who enact an indeterminate, processual shar-
ing of diff erences. Th e constitution of the common presupposes active, 
open- ended cooperation as its logical condition of possibility and at once 
its outcome. Th us, the heterotopic collective of desubjectifi ed subjects 
aboard  Th e Pequod , departicularized Bartleby or, as I will add, the rioto-
crats and pirate- utopians of the “Th e Encantadas,” could serve as concep-
tual personae for thinking the common. Further, Roberto Esposito posits 
a politics severed from the “idolatry of the person” and the governing 
distinctions between the human and the inhuman. In his  Th ird Person, 
Esposito detects a “becoming- animal” at the center of the impersonal 
that constellates “completely heterogeneous terms – like a human being, 
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animal, and micro- organism.” 24  Th e impersonal comes into contact with 
the inhuman, one example of which is how Melville “insinuates the for-
eign, even inhuman language of the whale into English.” 25  Th us Melville’s 
characters, as they are shorn of identities of nation, class, race, person-
hood, or even humanness, enter into new confi gurations of inhuman and 
impersonal political bodies. As I will unfold in greater depth in the text 
that follows, Melville’s politics of the inhuman becomes realized variously 
across his corpus:  in what I will call  Moby- Dick’s “ethopolitics,”  Pierre’s 
material- aff ective relationality, “Th e Encantadas’ ” outlandish politics,  Th e 
Confi dence Man’s misanthropology, or his later poetry’s politics of dissolu-
tion and disappearance. 
 Despite the persistence of Spinoza’s thought for Melville as both an 
ontological and metaphorical  point de capiton , Melville is by no means a 
straightforward Spinozist. His encounter with Spinoza, of course, is just 
one of the many philosophical encounters into which his writing enters. 
Th roughout  Herman Melville and the Politics of the Inhuman , I reconfi gure 
his work as a series of such encounters, from his meditations on indigene-
ity after Rousseau in  Typee ; his cartography of neo- Platonic forms across 
the seascapes of  Mardi ; the creative use of Cartesian vortices of  Moby- 
Dick ; his repurposing of Goethe, Carlyle, or German Idealism in  Pierre ; 
his rewriting of Darwin in “Th e Encantadas”; his satirical countering of 
Emerson and reanimation of Cynicism in  Th e Confi dence- Man ; his rela-
tion to Hegel in  Clarel, all the way to his late interest in Schopenhauer 
in  Billy Budd. One of the broad tasks of this book is to off er detailed 
examinations of how Melville responds to, reanimates, if not recreates 
his philosophical precursors. As such, I will often unfold my arguments 
through the open- ended  agon of the bibliographic and the philosophical, 
taking a keen interest in Melville’s reading, but also endeavoring to put 
it into its wider literary, intellectual, historical, or political contexts. One 
of the diffi  culties but also one of the joys of reading Melville is to fi nd 
his writing as enmeshed in networks of reference and concepts, networks 
that point less to an anxiety of infl uence than to an excess of infl uence. 
Given the relational form of his thinking- writing, Melville stages a series of 
asystematic, dialogical, or even confl icting politico- philosophical positions 
and imaginative trajectories. But the often- quiet presence of Spinoza, as if 
standing just off stage behind the ontological curtain, and far from func-
tioning in any exclusionary way, rather shapes the radical complementarity 
of Melville’s thought. Schopenhauer’s assertion, in a passage marked by 
Melville in his copy of  World as Will and Idea , could therefore serve as an 
axiom for his thinking: “For opposites throw light upon each other, and 
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the day at once reveals both itself and the night, as Spinoza admirably 
remarks.” 26  
 Character and the Inhuman 
 But if the acutest sage be often at his wits’ end to understand living character, 
shall those who are not sages expect to run and read character in those mere 
phantoms which fl it along the page like shadows along a wall?  Herman 
Melville,  Th e Confi dence- Man 27  
 Th e passages Melville marks in Arnold’s “Spinoza” can provide a provi-
sional point of entry into the key philosophical question this book will 
engage: namely, how Melville draws on Spinoza’s radically nonanthropo-
centric relational ontology to dramatize his own politics of the inhuman. 
In what follows, however, my enquiries into the politics of the inhuman 
in Melville’s work often take as their initial premise that, for him, literary 
“character” is not about the development of a fi ctional individual’s per-
sonal interiority or subjectivity. Rather, from Ahab to Bartleby, or Isabel 
to Billy Budd, Melville’s characters seem unmoored from personhood, cast 
into the “whelming sea” of the impersonal or the inhuman ( Clarel , 4.35.33). 
For Melville, character is not the site of the suturing of the aff ective to the 
embodied, but a process of entering into material- aff ective relationships 
that do not abide by interior– exterior, subject– object, human– inhuman, 
person– thing, or even immaterial– material distinctions. Melville’s idea of 
character, then, fundamentally diff ers from German Romantic ideas such 
as those of Friedrich Schlegel, for whom characterization is a presentation 
of the development [ Bildung ] of the passions of an individual, 28  or, simi-
larly, from that of Hegel who, in his  Aesthetics , shows how world- historical 
subjectivity unfolds through the pathos of the individual character’s per-
son. 29  Melville would also depart from other novelists such as Henry James. 
As James writes in his preface to  Th e Portrait of a Lady , the “germ of his 
idea” did not begin with “any fl ash, upon the fancy, of a set of relations, 
or in any one of those situations that, by a logic of their own, immediately 
fall, for the fabulist, into movement, into a march or a rush, a patter of 
quick step; but altogether in the sense of a single character, the character 
and aspect of a particular engaging young woman, to which all the usual 
elements of a ‘subject,’ certainly of a setting, were need to be superadded.” 30  
James, at least in this instance, by fi nding ways to “superadd” the elements 
of a “subject,” reorganizes inhuman imperatives or contingencies to fi t a 
centralizing “single” human character, no matter how nuanced, attenuated 
or diminutive his representations of the character’s consciousness become. 
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 Melville instead suggests a motion away from form or subject, as in the 
exemplary case of the “original” character in  Th e Confi dence- Man whose 
characteristics are “raying away” or becoming externalized ( CM , 239). More 
generally across his work, and especially from  Moby- Dick forward, he does 
not individuate characters as a subject or form, but rather as constituted 
and deconstituted by inhuman forces or driven by inhuman imperatives. 
Character as a set of compositions and diff erentials, or as Claire Colebrook 
asserts, the capturing of “a singular encounter of forces.” 31  Character as a 
process of morphogenesis. Character as the dynamic site of the suturing 
of the aff ective to the embodied, and in turn the point of their mutual 
dispersal. Character as “developed” through eff acement. Character as a 
fl itting phantom. Character as many- sided: as the site of the personifi ed 
impersonal or inhuman human. Characterology as geology or meteorol-
ogy: Ahab the wind, Bartleby the wall, Isabel the stone, Oberlus the tor-
toise, Celio the chemical reaction, Billy Budd the eye of the bull. 32  
 Melville’s characters have prompted many to rethink the categories of 
the human, the personal, and the individual, so to see them as not only 
traversed but also indeed construed by various inhuman material forces. 
As much as this often involves the volatile processes of inherent to the 
becoming- inhuman of humans, Melville also attunes us to the precari-
ous anthropomorphisms of nonhumans. Behind the notorious becoming- 
stone of characters like Pierre, Isabel, or Bartleby, that is, we could also 
recognize a series of stone characters who conversely strive to become 
human. “Standing face to face” with the marble Demosthenes, as Melville 
remarks in his reconstructed lecture “Statues of Rome,” “one must say to 
himself, ‘Th is is he’ ” ( PT , 400). 33  Demosthenes, with his “strong arm, mus-
cular form, the large sinews, all bespeak of the thunderer of Athens who 
hurled his powerful denunciations at Philip of Macedon”; yet, at the same 
time, as getting to know him reveals, he is also a man wan and haggard, an 
advocate perhaps in need of a “glorious course of idleness” to recuperate 
(400). In Demosthenes – or in the other stone “personages” that populate 
the lecture (Socrates the “Irish comedian,” Seneca the “disappointed pawn-
broker,” and Plato the “modern  valet- de- chambre ”) – Melville stresses, if 
paradoxically, the “more humane aspects” of the inanimate forms before 
him (400– 1, 404). Demosthenes, as both muscular and haggard, embod-
ies competing human aff ective imperatives and inhuman trajectories of 
force. His “expressive marble” might thus recall Melville’s fi gure of the 
iron man Talus from “Th e Bell- Tower” who, per the intention of his crea-
tor Bannadonna, would have him “possess the power of locomotion, and, 
along with that, the appearance, at least, of intelligence and will” ( PT , 400, 
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177). Yet Talus, an inverse analogue of Demosthenes in Melville’s imagina-
tion, rather “evinces no personality” (177). If human life is imprisoned in 
statuary, it is not because the stone constrains this life, but because life is 
still  in potentia in the repose of their frozen forms. Th e Laoco ö n group, as 
it had for a generation of Romantic thinkers before him, presents Melville 
with “the very semblance of a great and powerful man writhing with the 
inevitable destiny which he cannot throw off ” ( PT , 403– 4). Th e  Venus de 
Medici could transform into a Polynesian maiden. Cellini’s  Perseus , “con-
ceived in the fi ery brain of the intense artist and brought to perfection as a 
bronze cast in the midst of fl ames” could provide the “unalterable mould” 
for Ahab ( MD , 108). It is as if Melville wants to discern the inorganic 
life, or perhaps the human inhumanity, of these creations, to let stone 
surfaces and sinews twist into arms that can cast Philippics, or writhe in 
woe; to let ironclad gestures give the appearance of intelligence or agency. 
Demosthenes the stone stutterer or Talus the metallic murderer thus join 
the collective of human– inhuman characters that populate Melville’s work. 
 To explore the philosophical and political questions suggested by 
Melville’s human– inhuman characters, this book draws on and diverges 
from recent work that has dealt with questions of impersonality, posthu-
manism, and new materialism. Insofar as these theoretical strands have 
been motivated by the work of Gilles Deleuze, it is useful fi rst to note his 
conceptualization of how Melville’s characters undo the representational 
coherences that govern personhood or human particularity in the name 
of the inhuman. For Deleuze, signifi cantly, “the biggest problem haunting 
Melville’s oeuvre” is indeed “reconciling” the inhuman and the human.” 34  
Figures such as Bartleby, Isabel, or Billy Budd thus open a “zone of inde-
termination or indiscernibility” ( ECC , 76) in which characters merge with 
one another and their surroundings; they become atmospheric events or 
reverberations that pass into aff ective landscapes. To come to this, Deleuze 
invokes Melville’s original character in  Th e Confi dence- Man as the epit-
ome of this process of dissociation from fi xed human identity. Following 
Melville’s description of the original as a “revolving Drummond light” 
( CM , 239), Deleuze’s original “throws a livid white light on his surround-
ings”; it is “sometimes the immobile source of this light – like the fore-
topman high up on the mast, Billy Budd the bound, hanged man who 
‘ascends’ with the glimmering of the dawn, or Bartleby standing in the 
attorney’s offi  ce  – and sometimes its dazzling passage, a movement too 
rapid for the ordinary eye to follow, the lightning of Ahab or Claggart” 
( ECC , 83). For Deleuze, Melville brings to bear the encounter of characters 
like Pierre, the Attorney, or Vere with fi gures of primary nature, Isabel, 
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Bartleby, or Billy Budd, an encounter that destroys them, leaving them 
wrecks of reason. Bartleby’s formula, Isabel’s murmur, or Budd’s stutter 
become fi gures for a departicularizing motion that emancipates character 
from human personality into a multiplicity of disordered haecceities. 
 In the wake of  – or separate from  – Deleuze’s infl uential work, the 
manner with which Melville decouples character from personhood has 
recently received increasing attention. For Sharon Cameron, to take just 
one example, Melville’s characters are likewise unconfi ned to the personal; 
they become processes by which personal characteristics become emanci-
pated, or are given over to an excess. In her haunting chapter on Melville 
in  Impersonality: Seven Essays , Cameron also draws on the theory of origi-
nal characters to unfold the implications of the impersonal in  Billy Budd . 
As Cameron writes: “[i] n constructing a set of eff aced distinctions which 
are like those that dominate persons but outside of a characterological 
realm, Melville treats persons as if they were not governed by a set of con-
straints that diff erentiate them from other phenomena, as if a person were 
not diff erent from a stone or a manifestation of light.” 35  Cameron takes 
recourse to Melville’s late reading of Schopenhauer to elaborate how the 
“essence” of all personal characteristics is identical to the essence of all 
phenomena:  “the essence of a stone and the essence of a mind are the 
same (not just the same kind of ) thing.” 36  Schopenhauer’s metaphysics 
is echoed in Melville’s movement across categories of materiality and 
immateriality, stone and mind. Th is movement is not exactly metaphori-
cal: Budd becomes indiff erent from a stone not because of a metaphorical 
transport, but because all things which are diff erent nonetheless have the 
same essence. Individuality is “annulled,” and characters overfl ow into one 
another or into the “circumambient” world. 37  
 I will return to Cameron’s reading of  Billy Budd in my conclusion to 
consider how Spinoza might have us reorient Schopenhauerian readings 
of questions volition, individuation, and the inhuman that Melville’s last 
novella raises. Suffi  ce it to say for now that one goal of  Herman Melville 
and the Politics of the Inhuman is to extend formulations of impersonal 
character in Cameron’s reading of  Billy Budd (or similarly in Branka Arsi ć ‘s 
reading of “Bartleby”) across a broader range of Melville’s works. In so 
doing, I will resituate theories of characterological impersonality as part 
of a complex Spinozist philosophical inheritance that informs Melville’s 
relational, materialist political ontology  – as derived, that is, from how 
Spinoza reads human actions as “lines, planes, or bodies.” What is more, 
the concept of the inhuman that Melville evinces from Spinoza’s pro-
foundly nonanthropocentric philosophy also avails his work to approaches 
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that fl atten ontological distinctions among species and types of material-
ity. Geoff rey Sanborn’s “Melville and the Nonhuman” surveys Melville’s 
deep responsiveness to forms of animal and plant life, again eschewing 
individuality in the name of “a life among others” in which one is “simul-
taneously individuating oneself and slipping into the vast stream of indi-
viduations.” 38  Matthew Taylor’s  Universes Without Us , although it does not 
treat Melville, discloses “posthumanist cosmologies” in Poe, Chestnutt, or 
Hurston in which the human is incorporated in “non- human processes” 
and human agency is redistributed among “hybrid relations and dynamic 
human- nonhuman assemblages.” 39  In so doing Taylor criticizes forms of 
posthumanist thought that, in deprivileging the human, inadvertently 
extend human agency to nonhumans, or erase human agency altogether. 
Likewise, new and vibrant materialists like Manuel DeLanda, Samantha 
Frost, Jane Bennett, and Karen Barad have opened new theoretical vistas 
from which to reconsider Melville’s investments into materiality, nonhu-
man/ extended agency, and relational ontology. In particular, I  draw on 
Barad’s notion of “entanglement” in the context of  Moby- Dick to explicate 
how Melville’s relational ontology becomes eventuated through the “inter-
twined agential performance” 40  of human and nonhuman actants. 
 By charting Melville’s inhumanities, my approach thus shares much 
with posthumanism and the new materialism; yet, my characterization 
of Melville’s politics as a politics of the inhuman (rather than of the “non-
human” or “posthuman”) is not merely a semantic caprice. By focusing 
on the inhuman as it functions in Melville’s writing, that is, I endeavor 
to interpret his ontologies of matter and relation on their own terms as 
they creatively reanimate and resist the European philosophical tradi-
tion. To this end, my use of “inhuman” follows Melville’s own use of the 
word: from Isabel’s “bewildering feeling of the inhumanities” in  Pierre ( P, 
157)  or the Cosmopolitan’s reproach of Mark Winsome’s thought as an 
“inhuman philosophy” in  Th e Confi dence- Man , to scenes of the “inhu-
man” sea and earth of  Clarel and  John Marr (4.10.37– 8; 4.13.7;  PP , 249). 
Melville fi gures the inhuman as an inscrutable, if not implacable, colloca-
tion of physical forces, agencies, and material processes that might assail 
the human but nonetheless always already dwell within and act through 
the human. 41  Admittedly, in Melville’s writing, the inhuman sometimes 
describes acts of cruelty: Melville’s misanthropes can certainly be cruel, and 
one must always be wary of the “inhumanity” of autocratic ship captains. 
But operative as a concept in Melville’s work, the inhuman destabilizes 
complacent normative determinations of human identity, individuality, or 
personhood. If human  vanitas is often his target, Melville not only seeks to 
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chastise a human- all- too- human humanity. Across the vast seascapes and 
landscapes of his work, he diagrams an ontology of inhuman forces. As 
such, I bring Melville into proximity with Elizabeth  Grosz’s feminist new 
materialism. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s assertion that “humans are 
made exclusively of inhumanities,” 42  Grosz explores how nonliving, cos-
mic forces make possible human aff ects, sensations, or indeed becomings. 43  
Grosz develops her inhuman ontology into a “politics of imperceptibility” 
that runs counter to a Hegelian “politics of recognition.” 44  From another 
perspective, Jeff rey Jerome Cohen, in  Stone: Ecology of the Inhuman, pro-
poses a notion of the inhuman that resonates with Melville’s own lithocul-
tural propensities: “I speak of the inhuman to emphasize both diff erence 
(‘in- ’ as negative prefi x) and intimacy (‘in- ’ as indicator of estranged inte-
riority).” 45  Grosz and Cohen, if diff erently, theorize the intensity of human 
“transformative involvements” with the inhuman, and point to an incipi-
ent politics wrought from multifarious and collective endeavors to perse-
vere in an inhuman universe. 
 Melville’s politics of the inhuman, by emphasizing the pluralism of tran-
sindividual relations, remains wary of overly sanguine readings of Spinoza 
that assert a latter- day monism, and any concomitant annulments of iden-
tity into a transcendent oneness. One can merely note how Melville often 
represents the action of pulling back from losses of individuality into a 
“pantheistic” whole (Ishmael’s warning to sunken- eyed Platonists on the 
masthead, the hesitation to “live in the all” in his letter to Hawthorne, or 
the tragic consequences of Pierre’s vexed quest for self- renunciation). He 
instead posits a plural ontology of relations: the archipelago as a nontotal-
izing form, heterotopic commonalties such as his “plurality of mortals”, 
the “ragged edges” of truth – in short a proto- radical empiricism of dis-
junctive syntheses and loose confederations. As a disanthropocentrizing 
but nontotalizing force, the inhuman renaturalizes the human or brings 
the human into proximity with its multiple estranged interiorities: the 
inhumanities that dwell within us and from which we are “exclusively” 
made. If man, as Spinoza notes, might fl atter himself to be an “ imperium 
in imperio ” in the natural world, the inhuman lays siege to his vain citadel. 
Th e inhuman is the humility of humanity. 
 Uncemented Stones: Towards a Poetics and Politics of Relation 
 Herman Melville and the Politics of the Inhuman is an attempt to register 
the forms of relation Melville’s writing makes perceptible, and to think 
of them both materially and politically. Melville’s writing is composed of 
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movements and patterns. It is composed of tenuous couplings of rope and 
fl esh and of pressing physical immensities like the Great Pyramid and the 
dark inhuman sea. Lines form into wrinkled brows and striated charts, 
and colors into dalliances of atmosphere and light. Th e singular “stone 
unhewn” of his poem “On a Natural Monument” from  Battle- Pieces does 
not stand apart from the ponderous South Seas stones of  Typee or the 
Memnon stone of  Pierre , from the Bunker Hill Monument in  Israel Potter , 
or the piles of stones that dot the barren Judea of his journals and  Clarel : 
“Th e hills. Are stones in the concrete. Regular layers of rock; some amphi-
theaters disposed in seats, & terraces. Th e stone walls (loose) seem not 
the erections of art, but mere natural variations of the stony landscape.” 46  
Melville’s loose stone walls, or rocky topographies of Pacifi c or Grecian 
archipelagoes, or for that matter the monkey- rope that binds Ishmael and 
Queequeg, serve as topologies for collectivities of singularities. Yet the 
material relations through which Melville relentlessly unfolds his writing – 
from the lithic to the fl eshy, or the atmospheric to the hempen – form part 
of his nonanthropocentric political ontology. Th e question Melville asks 
in  Israel Potter , “Are not men built into communities just like bricks into a 
wall?” then emerges as a key political question, as if a human politics could 
emerge out of a common materiality with an aggregate of stones. 47  
 Along these lines, each chapter of  Herman Melville and the Politics of the 
Inhuman is organized around one or several modes of relation, and how 
through these modes of relation, Melville develops his materialist political 
ontology. In  Chapter 1 , I examine four fi gures of transformative relational-
ity operative in  Moby- Dick : namely, concatenation, prosthetics, immanent 
materiality, and geometrics. First, I  explore how Melville’s concatenated 
fi gures literalize forms of relationality and transformation as a material and 
ontological interweaving. I  then turn to Ahab (one usually understood 
as the paragon of ego or personality) to reconsider him in terms of his 
transindividual, prosthetic relationships with human and inhuman others. 
Across the novel, what is more, Melville dramatizes an immanent, rela-
tional ontology as both human and nonhuman characters are immersed 
in manifold substances and dynamic material systems. And, as the novel 
cuts into bodies and creates composites of forces and nexuses of objects, it 
opens new forms of spatiality that, as I will argue, can be best understood 
in terms of contemporary nineteenth- century advances in non- Euclidean 
geometry. As it does so, it points to an “ethopolitics” of partial bodies, 
of mutual enactments and collective agencies, of material interpenetra-
tions and intersecting and interwoven singularities. In  Chapter 2 , I turn to 
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 Pierre to unfold further how Melville draws on Spinoza’s nonanthropocen-
tric relational ontology, as mediated by Goethe and others, and in terms of 
the relation between the “all” and “one.” As if following the imperative of 
Goethe to “live in the all,” Isabel seeks to be subsumed into an inhuman 
“allness,” but Pierre, as he tries to “live in the all,” suff ers from a series of 
destructive encounters. Pierre is Melville’s novel of sensations, and a novel 
that probes the relation between materiality and aff ect. Melville diagrams 
how invisible forces aff ect bodies and move through stone and air. To this 
end, Isabel’s pervasive murmur, as what might be called a “liminal sensa-
tion,” eff ects a muted yet insistent sonority as it traverses the novel’s mate-
rial forms and aff ective territories, and seemingly deindividualizes Pierre. 
Melville fi gures his inhuman politics through Pierre’s material- aff ective 
relations and, ultimately, his vexed quest to “live in the all.” Far from a 
failed book of a bitter writer, I contend that  Pierre is a vital psycho- philo-
sophical – and political – experiment into the legacies of Spinozism. 
 In  Chapter 3 , after a brief transitional discussion of  Israel Potter, I shift 
focus to Melville’s human– inhuman collectivities on the Gal á pagos archi-
pelago in “Th e Encantadas, or the Enchanted Isles.” Th e archipelago func-
tions variously as a topography, an ontology of relation, and a method 
of writing. Parodying Darwin, Melville limns an “alternate taxonomy” of 
outlandish 48  animals on the islands, and a set of characters at the threshold 
of vanishing into its hostile landscapes, into a world both half- formed and 
always already ruined. Blurred identities materialize into hybrid and gro-
tesque creatures; relations seem elusive if not enchanted. Animal societies 
and human societies merge into uncertain congeries. Yet the archipelago 
also functions as a political ontology of relation that disregards human– 
inhuman distinctions in favor of heterogeneous, departicularized, and 
heterotopic communalities. In the later sketches, through fi gures like the 
hybrid Dog- King or the Hermit Oberlus, Melville dramatizes the poten-
tials and risks of any outlandish revolutionary politics: namely that mutual 
communal production is always in danger of slipping back into pater-
nal authority, misanthropy, or totalizing identity. Th e political question 
Melville comes to ask through “Th e Encantadas” is: What will separate 
the communitarian and universal fraternity from their misanthropical 
counterparts? 
 In  Chapter 4 , I expand my discussion of commonality and misanthropy 
in  Pierre and “Th e Encantadas” in the context of Melville’s last novel,  Th e 
Confi dence- Man . In  Th e Confi dence- Man , Melville’s communitarians are 
punctuated by a series of complex and many- sided fi gures of man- hatred. 
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Th ey put to the test not only Melville’s own depictions of commonality, 
but also recent theorizations of the “common.” As a “misanthropology,” 
I argue that Melville fi gures misanthropy in three interrelated ways. First, 
as a  misanthrope- ology , that is, as a performative theory of misanthropy 
in a series of dialogic exchanges among the shifting set of characters, and 
drawing on classical and Shakespearian precedents, especially  Timon of 
Athens . Second, Melville gives direct political purchase to his theory of 
misanthropy in the novel’s probing of the “metaphysics of Indian hating,” 
in which his  misanthrope- ology modulates into a  mis- anthropology. Th e par-
adoxical subjectivity of the “genial misanthrope” becomes realized as the 
“backwoodsman” who uses Christian charity to legitimize violence against 
Native Americans. Th ird, Melville’s misanthropology in  Th e Confi dence- 
Man actively decenters the  Anthropos as the reference point of the politi-
cal. Th at is, by countering Emersonian Transcendentalism and drawing on 
ancient Cynicism, Melville develops an “inhuman” political philosophy 
that blurs human/ nonhuman boundaries and compels us to rethink the 
anthropocentric biases of our empathetic investments in nonhuman life. 
 Chapters  5 and  6 further unfold Melville’s inhuman politics through 
his “poetics of relation.” In  Chapter 5 , I investigate how Melville’s charac-
ters in  Clarel become a series of intertwined “personae” who merge with 
each other, with literary, historical, or Biblical personages, and with the 
inhuman landscapes of the poem. Melville’s characters are deindividu-
ated in  Clarel in their encounters with the physical spaces and material 
forces of the Jerusalem cityscape and the sublime wildernesses of the Holy 
Land. Melville’s characters in  Clarel become stones themselves, if not geo-
logical processes of erosion and dispersion. Melville, throughout  Clarel , 
searches a complex world of inhuman imperatives. And, in cantos such 
as “Concerning Hebrews,” he again turns to Spinoza to reveal the vanity 
of seeing the world in “reference to man.” Finally, in  Chapter 6 I  focus 
on how questions of form, relation, and dissolution become operative in 
Melville’s other poetry. In ways deeply resonant with much of his oeu-
vre, Melville fi gures human characters as both individuated and deindi-
viduated by inhuman material forces and landscapes. In  Battle- Pieces, John 
Marr ,  Timoleon, or  Weeds and Wildings , he develops an entropic poetics 
and an ontology of material and aff ective relations not circumscribed by 
any anthropocentric  vanitas : fallen soldiers, shipwrecked mariners, if not 
entire ancient civilizations seemingly vanish into the inhuman earth and 
sea. As in “Th e Encantadas,” in  Timoleon, Melville once again uses the 
archipelago form to instantiate relationality and dissolution across several 
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physical, aesthetic, and philosophical registers. In “Rip Van Winkle’s 
Lilac,” Melville develops a poetics of aging and of material decay in which 
growing old and death become transindividual, transformative events of 
relating with and within the inhuman. As a poetry of monumentalizing 
and erasure, Melville’s later poetry thus archives the mutual dissolutions 
of forms and of persons. Yet, as it does so, it remains radically open to 
new forms of interrelation and inhuman transformation, recollection, and 
renewal. I end the book with a short coda devoted to  Billy Budd in which, 
I argue, we can again fi nd Melville close to Spinoza. 
 
 Despite the risk that the “amenities” with which those who would denounce 
Spinoza might continue to be in vogue, Melville variously explores in his 
writing the liberations and limitations opened by the Spinozist inher-
itance as he encountered it in nineteenth- century thought. Across this 
book, I  chart how Melville’s characters become imbricated in material- 
aff ective relationships, undergo metamorphoses into hybrid human– 
inhuman forms, or become invisible within his landscapes, so to explicate 
a nonanthropocentric relational thinking. 49  More of course could be said 
about works not included in this study, from the early romances  Typee , 
 Omoo or  Mardi ,  Piazza Tales like “Th e Piazza” and “Benito Cereno,” or 
the rich mosaics of late poems like  Th e Burgundy Club . But if the arc of 
these chapters, even if not exhaustive, follows the chronology of Melville’s 
publications, the focus rests on the elements and relations, movements 
and encounters that come alive in Melville’s writing. We move away from 
a hermeneutic geared toward uncovering biographical correspondences 
(including the prose/ poem distinction) that still predetermine responses 
to his work. It is rather to trace lines and groupings, trajectories and cir-
culations; to let patterns or colorings (even minor or subterranean ones) 
come to light; or, to follow lines of strata or lines of splintering destrati-
fi cation. It is to fi nd relations among his manifold solitaries and loose 
stones. 
 Samuel Beckett, in one of his few comments on Melville, states that 
despite the fact that there is “too much symbol- chasing going on the 
States,” Melville “still has a lot to say to us.” 50  Finally, this book is an 
attempt to hear what Melville still has to say to us – in terms of how a 
rethinking of the extent our relations, of our deeply inhuman condition, 
might open new potentials for understanding the “world we live in.” As 
Beckett says in  Th e Unnamable, “Th at I am not stone deaf is shown by the 
sounds that reach me.” 51  
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